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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the discussion on fiscal federalism by analyzing
the impact of institutional arrangements on the performance of the public
sector. For a long time public finance has set a focus on the efficiency con-
sequences of competition between subordinate jurisdictions in federations.
The competition for mobile resources and the accompanying inefficiencies in
public spending have been subject to an outpouring of literature.1 But the
welfare loss can be reduced by institutional arrangements. Over the past
years research has identified transfers that can enhance welfare in competi-
tive environments (Johnson, 1988, Wildasin, 1989, and DePater and Myers,
1994).2 Whether they are actually effective in reducing the welfare loss de-
pends on the objectives of the implementing government. The traditional
approaches assume that a social planner organizes the public sector to the
best of his ability. Equalization is then able to implement efficiency as well as
equity at the same time (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006, Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2002).
However, welfare maximizing governments are clearly a strong assumption.
Bu¨ttner et al. (2006) argue that authorities often tend to maximize revenue
rather than the social welfare. Consequently a superordinate government
sets too strong incentives to raise taxes and an inefficiently high level of
public services is provided. This paper concentrates on the political process
determining transfer systems. As regional authorities often gain influence on
central policy, equalization is decided in a common decision process rather
than by an autonomous central planner.
Transfer systems play an important role in the fiscal relations of many feder-
ations. Especially on the local level transfers secure an equal level of public
spending among different regions and a minimum supply with public services.
The great importance of grants for the local public sector motivates that re-
gional authorities aim to influence the shape of the equalization systems to
1See Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2002) for an overview.
2This result is confirmed by various empirical studies, e.g., Dahlby and Warren (2003),
Bu¨ttner (2006), and Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007).
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their advantage. Political economy provides different approaches to explain
the impact of lower-level governments on central policy decisions concerning
transfer systems (e.g., Homburg, 1994, Milligan and Smart, 2005). Either
subordinate governments are able to influence upper-level policy in represen-
tative chambers or local governments have influence more indirectly by lobby-
ism. Anyway local players clearly gain some influence on the central decision
concerning transfer systems and they change them to their own advantage.
Besides, equalization is not only a part of central policy decisions, but it also
takes place more indirectly in local cooperative arrangements. Since con-
tributions to local cooperation, like Special Purpose Districts, counties and
other forms of local arrangements, are regularly dependent on the local tax
base, they mitigate the tax competition like equalization systems do. These
jurisdictions are built up for a common public good supply. While a transfer
system pays grants in terms of tax revenue to the regions, the allocation of
public spending in a local cooperative arrangement is a transfer in terms of
public goods. The incentives arising from both institutional arrangements
are very similar and cooperation on public spending might also be seen as a
locally organized equalization system.
The local impact on centrally organized transfer systems as well as equal-
ization in local cooperative arrangements raises the question whether the
local objectives diverge from the central perspective. The decision on equal-
ization is no longer made by one instance, but resembles more a process of
bargaining between the authorities of the affiliated jurisdictions. Bargaining
as a decision process influences the implemented policy. Therefrom it does
seem necessary to rethink the idea of efficiency implementing equalization
systems. Given the large number of functional jurisdictions in many federa-
tions the impact of local players on equalization seems interesting and widely
unknown.
This paper provides a bargaining model, in which two regions negotiate on
an equalization system. It clarifies not only the priorities local authorities
have when they influence the decision of an upper-level government on fiscal
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equalization. At the same time it explains the allocation of public spending
and the local tax rate choice in local cooperative arrangements as they are a
form of equalization. Even though the instruments provided to cooperation
are identical to those of a social planner, efficiency can be neither achieved
in the private nor in the public sector. The bargaining process acts like
an additional objective to the optimization problem so that a constitutional
framework has to provide more instruments to promote efficiency.
Bargaining in the public sector has been subject to only a few contributions
to literature yet. Persson and Tabellini (1996) examine two regions bargain-
ing over a local insurance system against income shocks. They emphasize
that regions with better risks will prevent full insurance since this would be
redistributing. Kessler et al. (2007) and Hickey (2007) concentrate on coop-
eration for the sake of internalizing spillovers. However, all these approaches
assume the contribution to cooperation to be independent from the local tax
rate decision. Looking especially at local cooperative arrangements, there is
probably more to the story as contributions often depend on the local tax
base. The interaction of tax competition and cooperation on equalization is
subject to my paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the basic model is
introduced. Then, in section 3, it is extended by an equalization system
and its optimal design chosen by a central planner. Section 4 compares this
choice with an equalization system negotiated in a common decision process
of the regions. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
A federal economy consists of two regions i, i = 1, 2. In each region i a rep-
resentative firm is located. With a mobile factor capital ki and an immobile
factor land, it produces using a linear-homogeneous technology f . Land is
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equal in both regions so that the technology can be reduced to a quadratic
production function f(ki). In a competitive market the profit of each firm is
zero. The price for capital equals the net rate of return r plus the tax rate τi
on it. The firms employ capital so that f ′(ki) = r+τi is satisfied. The capital
demand of the regions, implicitly defined by this condition, is expressed by
φi(r + τi) = ki.
It is assumend that f ′′′ = 0 holds so that φ′i(τi + r) is equal in both regions
and therefore φ′. Furthermore, from the profit maximization condition, it
follows φ′ = 1
f ′′
< 0.
Regions are identical except of their capital endowment si. Region 1 provides
s1 =
S
2
+ σ
2
to the market, σ > 0, where S is the sum of savings in the
federation. At the same time s2 =
S
2
− σ
2
is assumed for region 2, the
difference of capital endowments between region 1 and 2 is σ. σ is assumed
to be small, so that the model deals only with a small asymmetry. The
capital stock in the federation is inelastic so that S = k1 + k2 holds. Using
the capital demand function ki = φi(r + τi) implicit differentiation of this
conditions yields
∂r
∂τi
= −
φ′
2 · φ′
= −
1
2
.
In both regions a representative resident offers land and capital to the market.
Land is paid a rent pii which is the residual of firms’ revenue after production
costs are deduced: pii = f(ki) − f
′(ki)ki. Residents consume a private good
ci and a public good gi so that their utility ui equals
ui = u(ci, gi) = ci + b(gi) (1)
with b′(gi) > 0 and b
′′(gi) < 0. Since there is no tax on households, private
consumption is a sum of the residual pii and the interest income rsi. Hence
it is expressed by ci = f(ki)− f
′(ki)ki + rki.
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The public good is offered by a benevolent government which maximizes
residents’ utility. To finance public spending a source-based tax τi is levied
on the regions’ employed capital. The budget of the local government must
be balanced. It is stated by
τiki = gi. (2)
In a decentralized economy local governments behave non-cooperatively and
compete for capital using the source-based tax as a strategic instrument. Po-
litical authorities’ optimal choice of the tax rate maximizes residents’ utility
ui subject to the local budget:
max
τi
ui s.t. τiki = gi. (3)
The optimum is described by the first order condition
b′(gi) =
ki +
1
2
(si − ki)
ki +
1
2
τiφ′
(4)
(proof 1). While the terms in the numerator constitute the marginal effect
of the tax decision on private consumption, the terms in the denominator
represent the change of tax revenue. If the capital endowment of the regions
is equal, ki = si holds and b
′(gi) > 1 is proved. Underprovision of public
spending arises in both regions and an inefficient mix of private and public
goods is consumed. When local governments increase their tax rates, they
generate a capital outflow. Ignoring the positive fiscal externality to the other
region both local governments choose an inefficiently low level of taxation.
If σ > 0, so that region 1 has a higher capital endowment than region 2 (s1 >
s2), not only fiscal, but pecuniary externalities must be taken into account.
As non-price takers on the capital markt, local governments influence the net
rate of return by their tax policy. A capital exporting region prefers a higher
interest rate r than a capital importing region because the interest income
affects private consumption. Since ∂r
∂τi
< 0, tax rates influence the net rate of
return negatively and a capital exporting region tends to set lower tax rate
in the Nash equilibrium of tax competition. While the pecuniary externality
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resolves the problem of underprovision at least to some extent in region 2,
it is aggregated to the fiscal externality in region 1. If one assumes a stable
Nash equilibrium and only a small asymmetry in the capital endowment,
τ¯1 < τ¯2 can be proved (see appendix: proof 2, result I). Due to a lower tax
rate more capital is employed in region 1 than in region 2 (k¯1 > k¯2). As
both regions are located one the left side of the laffer curve, g¯1 < g¯2 holds.
The level of public services in region 2 exceeds the one in region 1. Despite
of this residents’ utility in region 1 is higher than in region 2 (u¯1 > u¯2) (see
appendix: proof 2 result II).
3 Equalization and Tax Competition
Even though fiscal transfer systems aim to equalize public spending in feder-
ations, they have also an impact on the local tax rate decision. Since capital
outflow is compensated by higher grants, local governments tend to ignore
fiscal externalities caused by the tax competition and raise their tax rates.
Independent from their original motive cooperative arrangements induce a
comparable equalization. Public spending is regularly financed by a contri-
bution on the tax base so that the local tax decisions is influenced in the
same way like fiscal a capacity grant does. A small tax base causes a low
contribution to the cooperative arrangement while a region with high fiscal
capacity contributes more. Hence the contribution counteracts the tax deci-
sion and sets an incentive to raise taxes. While the central planner decides
autonomously on a set of contribution rates and transfers (ϑi, yi), i = 1, 2,
equalization within cooperative arrangements requires a joint decision of the
local governments on these instruments.
Even though different forms of equalization can be observed in federations
all over the word, the systems have a basic structure in common. To finance
a lump sum transfer yi, a marginal contribution rate ϑi on the local tax base
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ki is determined. Therefore the local budget is given by
(τi − ϑi)ki + yi = gi. (5)
Local governments choose the tax rate in order to maximize residents’ util-
ity ui given in equation (1) so as to balance their budget. The first order
condition describes the local tax rate choice in the optimum:
b′(gi) =
ki +
1
2
(si − ki)
ki +
1
2
(τi − ϑi)φ′
(6)
(proof 1). Since ϑi enters the denominator, the costs for public spending in
terms of outflowing capital are reduced. With a raising contribution rate the
importance of the fiscal externality decreases and the local government raises
its tax rate.
Independent from the optimal choice in different institutional settings, equal-
ization gives the opportunity to reallocate welfare. Since tax revenue can be
shifted from one region to the other by a lump sum transfer, local budgets
are not relevant, but an overall budget of the public sector has to be satisfied.
Therefore both, the central planner as well as the cooperative arrangement,
have to balance the budget given by
τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2 = 0. (7)
All Pareto efficient allocations generated by the equalization system are lo-
cated on the Pareto frontier P . It is defined by the maximal utility u2 subject
to the budget (7) and a constant level of the utility u1. The optimization
problem yields all allocations attainable by equalization. The choice of in-
struments, which implements these allocations, can be identified in a second
step by (5) and (6). Thus the maximization problem is inverted by choosing
first the optimal allocations and then identifying the instruments required to
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implement these allocations. It is stated by
max
τi,gi
u2 s.t. τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2 = 0 and u1 − uˆ1 = 0 (8)
with uˆ1 for a given level of utility u1. If µP is the Lagrange operator of the
second side condition, the slope of the Pareto frontier P is expressed by
duP2
duˆ1
= −µP (9)
(proof 3). The first order conditions also reveal µP = b
′(g2)/b
′(g1). Besides,
total differentiation of all first order conditions of (8) yields
dµ
duˆ1
> 0
by Cramers’ rule if 1/b′(g1) + 1/b
′(g2) < 4 is satisfied (proof 3). Thus the
Pareto frontier is strictly concave if the absolute values of the marginal util-
ities are sufficiently large. As reallocation of public income by transfers pro-
vokes a reaction in local tax policy, a problem might arise in very asymmetric
allocations of public spending. A region with a high net transfer might de-
crease its tax rate because of the lower marginal utility of public spending
and vice versa. But then capital is mainly employed in the region with a low
tax rate so that the sum of revenue in the federation decreases. This effect
might dominate the coordinating effect of equalization, especially when the
capital demand is assumed to be linear. Since the analysis here concentrates
on settings with small asymmetries, one can expect the level of regions’ public
spending in the Nash bargaining solution to be similar and nearby efficient.
Therefore this restriction is not relevant for the Nash bargaining and strict
concavity of the relevant range of P can be assumed.
As a benchmark case the allocation chosen by a central government is ana-
lyzed. It maximizes the social welfare w = u1 + u2 by deciding the on local
tax rates and the allocation of public spending (τi, gi), i = 1, 2, while the
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public budget (7) is balanced:
max
τi,gi
u1 + u2 s.t. τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2 = 0. (10)
The optimum is described by the first order conditions b′(g1) = b
′(g2) and
b′(gi) =
ki
ki +
1
2
(τi − τj)φ′
(11)
for i 6= j (proof 4). This can only be true if b′(gi) = 1, i = 1, 2, is the
case. Hence, it proves τ1 = τ2 = τ
∗. A central government equalizes public
spending and the tax rates on an efficient level. Thus capital is equally
employed among the regions (k1 = k2 = k
∗). The marginal utilities of public
spending and of private consumption are equal within and among the regions.
The maximal production output is realized and ∂ui
∂ci
= b′(gi) = 1, i = 1, 2,
proves first best efficiency to be realized. This result is independent from the
capital endowments of the regions.
Concerning the different signs of the pecuniary externalities, the incentives
set by the central planner are different for both regions. Choosing ϑi = τi,
the fiscal externalities are reduced to zero. In the case of a capital importing
region this contribution rate is too high because the pecuniary externality
counteracts the effect of the fiscal one. At the same time region 1 needs
a stronger incentive to raise its tax rate up to an efficient level. To define
the instruments chosen by the central planner, consider that the marginal
utilities in the equations (6) and (11) are identical and both equal one. From
there
1
2
(si − k
∗
i ) =
1
2
(τ ∗i − ϑ
∗
i )φ
′ (12)
must hold. Equal capital employment in the regions implies that 1
2
(si − ki)
is positive in region 1 but negative in region 2. Hence (τi − ϑi) must be
negative for 1 but positive for 2. Thus τ ∗1 < ϑ
∗
1 and τ
∗
2 > ϑ
∗
2 must be
satisfied. A lower level of tax rates leads to a higher net rate of return so
that the capital exporter is less willing to increase taxes. An equalization
system therefore needs to set stronger incentives to capital exporters than to
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importers.3 The incentive is even that strong, that region 1 contributes more
to the equalization system than its original tax revenue. It is only able to
do this because it receives a lump sum transfer. The transfers are defined by
equation (5). Since gi and τiki are equal for both regions and ϑ
∗
1 > ϑ
∗
2 holds,
y∗1 > y
∗
2 is proved.
Proposition 1 The central planner chooses to equalize public spending (b′(gi) =
1, i = 1, 2) as well as the tax rates (τ ∗1 = τ
∗
2 ) on the efficient level. Since the
capital exporter tends to set lower tax rates to ensure a higher interest in-
come for its resident, the incentive for region 1 needs to be stronger so that
ϑ∗1 > τ
∗
1 = τ
∗
2 > ϑ
∗
2 holds.
The central planners’ choice of equalization implements W (u∗1, u
∗
2) = W
∗.
The level of social welfare in W ∗ is the benchmark for the result of the
bargaining process between the regions.
4 Bargaining Process
Cooperation differs from other forms of governments at least in two aspects.
First of all, it is normally built up voluntarily, so that each affiliated juris-
diction needs to achieve improvement by the arrangement. Even though in
cooperative arrangements a common decision process takes place, all part-
ners involved have to accept the decision autonomously. Secondly, one can
generally expect the number of players involved in cooperation to be small.
Literature argues that larger unions tend to have a greater mismatch of pref-
erences so that costs of agreements raise with the number of cooperating
parties (Alesina et al., 2005). In contrast to a decision process with a large
number of participants, a small number enables each government to ensure a
3If σ = 0, the result from Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) holds: A full equalizing system
internalizes the fiscal externality (ϑi = τi). Since no pecuniary externality arises in this
situation, first best efficiency is realized.
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certain impact on the policy outcome. Both features of cooperative arrange-
ments imply a decision process which is more a bargaining between affiliated
jurisdictions rather than social welfare maximization within a region. This
must be considered in the analysis.
The bargaining process is modeled as a Nash bargaining game.4 The regions
negotiate on the allocation N defined by certain amounts of public spend-
ing and corresponding tax rates (gNi , τ
N
i ), i = 1, 2. Again, the instruments
(ϑNi , y
N
i ), i = 1, 2, which are required to implement the allocation N(g
N
i , τ
N
i ),
are identified in a second step so that the optimization problem is inverted.
The cooperative arrangement maximizes the Nash product subject to the
overall budget of the public sector given in (7). Therefore the optimization
problem is stated as follows
max
τi,gi
n s.t. τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2 = 0 (13)
with n = (u1−u¯1)(u2−u¯2). u¯i is regions’ utility in the disagreement outcome.
It is defined as the equilibrium of tax competition without equalization so
that u¯1 > u¯2 holds.
The optimal choice of (13) is described by first order condition
uN1 − u¯1
uN2 − u¯2
=
b′(g1)
b′(g2)
:= α (14)
(proof 5). The ratio of marginal utility of public spending equals the ratio of
the absolute improvement the regions achieve from cooperation. Is is defined
as α.
4Cooperation allows to enhance the welfare. The decision process on the distribution of
it is described by a surplus sharing game. As participation is voluntary, a Nash bargaining
game seems to be a plausible way to model the decision process; see Persson and Tabellini
(1996) Kessler et. al. (2007) among others.
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Furthermore, the solution of (13) yields
b′(g1) =
k1 +
1
2
(1− α)(s1 − k1)
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ′
(15)
for the marginal utility of public spending in region 1 and
b′(g2) =
k2 +
1
2
(1−α
α
)(s1 − k1)
k2 −
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ′
(16)
for the marginal utility of public spending in region 2 (proof 5).
In the Nash bargaining solution N the slope of the indifference curve of n
must be equal to the slope of the Pareto frontier so that
duP
2
duˆ1
∣∣
N
=
dun
2
du1
∣∣
N
holds.
N is the tangency point of both curves. (9) implies
duP
2
duˆ1
= −b′(g2)/b
′(g1) for
the slope of the Pareto frontier. By the implicit-function theorem one can
show that
dun
2
du1
= −(u2−u¯2)/(u1−u¯1) holds for the slope of the Nash product.
The central planner chooses W ∗ so that efficiency is enhanced. Since b′(g∗1) =
b′(g∗2) = 1, the slope of the Pareto frontier in W
∗ is −µP = −1. The slope of
the Nash product
dun
2
du1
in the allocation n(u∗1, u
∗
2) = W
∗ determines the Nash
bargaining solution. If
dun
2
du1
∣∣
W ∗
= −1, the regions agree on the same allocation
the central planner chooses. For
dun
2
du1
∣∣
W ∗
> −1 (
dun
2
du1
∣∣
W ∗
< −1), N differs from
the first best solution since the tangency point of the Nash product and the
Pareto frontier is on the left (right) side of W ∗ so that the Nash product n
subtends the Pareto frontier in W ∗. One can show, that in W ∗ the slope of
the Nash product is
dun2
du1
∣∣∣∣∣
W ∗
= −
u∗2 − u¯2
u∗1 − u¯1
< −1
(proof 6). Hence, from the strict convexity of the indifference curves of n
it follows that N is an allocation on the right side of W ∗. Because of the
strict concavity of P and −µ = −b′(g2)/b
′(g1), all allocations of the Pareto
13
Figure 1: Central Planner vs. Cooperation
u2
u1u¯1
u¯2
NW
∗
P
45◦
45◦′
frontier on the right sight of W ∗ imply g1 > g2. At the same time the first
order condition (14) of the Nash product implies g1 > g2 for all allocations
above 45◦’ line, while below this line the ratio is inverted. Therefrom the
Nash bargaining solution N is an allocation on the right sight of W ∗, but
above the 45◦’ line. Otherwise the allocation of public services implied by
the Pareto frontier and the Nash bargaining solution can not be true at the
same time.
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Thus α < 1 is proved. Public spending is not equalized and smaller in region
2 (gN1 > g
N
2 ). At the same time the absolute improvement u
N
i − u¯i is larger
for region 2 than for region 1.
Proposition 2 In a cooperation public spending is not equalized among the
regions and gN1 > g
N
2 holds. At the same time region 2 gains more absolute
improvement than region 1 so that (u1 − u¯1) < (u2 − u¯2) holds.
For α < 1 the first order conditions of the Nash product determine the tax
rate ratio to be τN1 < τ
N
2 . Since a higher tax rate results in less capital
employment, kN1 > k
N
2 holds.
Proposition 3 In the Nash bargaining solution N(uN1 , u
N
2 ) the tax rates sat-
isfy τN1 < τ
N
2 . The private sector is therefore inefficient since reallocation of
capital will cause a higher production output.
The implementation of the Nash bargaining solution requires a certain choice
of instruments (ϑNi , y
N
i ), i = 1, 2. However, without further information on
the size of the difference in the capital employment, these instruments cannot
be compared with the one of the central planner.
The reason for arising inefficiencies in the bargaining solution can be seen
in the twofold objective of the bargaining process: On the one hand the
equalization system aims to enhance efficiency. On the other hand the bar-
gaining process itself requires a specific share of improvements by the regions.
The bargaining solution is in need of acceptance of both local governments.
Thinking of the allocation W ∗ first best efficiency can be achieved by equal-
ization. In cooperation the rich region must be compensated for lower interest
income and receives a net transfer. This grant provokes a reaction on the
capital market so that τN1 < τ
N
2 holds in N . Therefore region 1 does not
only provide a higher level of public spending, the firms in this regions also
employ more capital.
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The model in this paper restricts compensation to transfers between the
public sectors. If a transfer between the private sectors would be allowed,
region 1’ decreasing interest income caused by higher tax rates could be
compensated directly and the regions would agree on an efficient allocation.
But since the private transfer would reallocate income from the region with
less capital endowment to the one with a higher stock of savings, it is hard
to think of political acceptance for an instrument like this and a restriction
to compensation within the public sector seems to be plausible.
5 Conclusion
The impact of local players on equalization confines the ability to improve
social welfare. In a locally decided transfer system public spending is not
equalized within the regions and the capital employment is divergent. While
in the uncoordinated equilibrium of tax competition the supply of public
services is higher in the region with low capital endowment, the equalization
system ensures a higher level of public spending in the region with high
capital endowment. Compensation is restricted to a transfer in terms of
public goods so that it always entails inefficiencies. If a transfer between the
private sectors would be allowed, region 1 would receive an additional side
payment financed by the private sector of region 2. However, it is hard to
think of political acceptance for an instrument reallocating from the poor to
the rich region.
The bargaining process acts like an additional objective to the optimization
problem. This is the reason why the cooperative arrangement is not able
to generate the same level of social welfare like a central planner does, even
though the same instruments are available. The result seems to be in con-
trast to the former findings of Coase (1960), who postulates that bargaining
between partners can internalize externalities and enhance efficiency. But
cooperative arrangements do not only have an efficiency goal, they also have
16
a redistributive motive. Concerning a reasonable restriction of instruments
it is not always possible to satisfy both purposes at the same time. A consti-
tutional framework would require a rich set of instruments to avoid efficiency
loss.
The results also suggest that in cooperative arrangements equity and effi-
ciency can not be reached at the same time. While a restriction of fiscal
instruments improves the regions’ equity to some extent, because the region
with a lower utility in the disagreement outcome is able to generate a higher
absolute improvement, the efficiency deceases. In contrast, a rich set of in-
struments allows enhancing efficiency, but, at the same time, the absolute
improvement of both regions is equal and equity is not promoted at all. The
choice of the constitutional framework for cooperation, made by an upper-
level government, has to weight these two contracting objectives. Equity can
only be realized at the expense of efficiency in the public sector. This is quite
a surprising result because previous research on tax competition and equal-
ization emphasizes that transfer systems can implement both at the same
time: equity and efficiency.
Appendix
Proof 1: Marginal Utility of the Residents.
Local perspective: In a federation without any equalization the utility is
given by
ui = f(φ(r(τi, τj) + τi))− f
′φ(r(τi, τj) + τi) + sir(τi, τj)
+b(τiφ(r(τi, τj))) = ui(τi, τj).
Thus the utility of the resident in region i in an autonomous setting depends
on the vector of tax rates of the federation. A local government maximizes
residents’ utility by choosing the optimal tax rate. The local choice is de-
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scribed by
∂ui
∂τi
= f ′(ki)φ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τi
)
− f ′′(ki)φ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τi
)
ki − f
′(ki)φ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τi
)
− si
∂r
∂τi
+b′(gi)
(
ki + τiφ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τi
))
=: 0.
Since 1/f ′′(ki) = φ
′ must be true from profit maximization and ∂r
∂τi
= −1
2
holds, rearranging brings
b′(gi) =
ki +
1
2
(si − ki)
ki +
1
2
τiφ′
.
In a federation with equalization a local government receives a lump sum
transfer yi and contributions ϑiki to the system. Thus residents’ utility is
given by
ui = f(φ(r(τi + τj), τi))− f
′φ(r(τi + τj), τi) + sir(τi + τj)
+b((τi − ϑi)φ(r(τi + τj), τi) + yi) = ui(τi, τj, ϑi, yi)
with i 6= j. Local authorities maximizes residents’ utility by choosing their
tax rate τi subject to their budget given in equation (5). From the local
perspective the instruments of the equalization systems are taken as given so
that the first order condition is
∂ui
∂τi
= −ki −
1
2
(si − ki) + b
′(gi)
(
ki + (τi − ϑi)φ
′
(
1−
1
2
))
=: 0
⇔ b′(gi) =
ki +
1
2
(si − ki)
ki +
1
2
(τi − ϑi)φ′
.
Central perspective: A central government and a cooperative arrangement
are able to reallocate tax revenue by equalization. Thus public spending in
the regions is independent from the tax rate. The utility of a resident in
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region i is stated by
ui = f(φ(r(τi, τj) + τi))− f
′φ(r(τi, τj) + τi) + sir(τi, τj) + b(gi) = ui(τi, τj , gi)
(A.1)
with i 6= j. Differentiation of equation (A.1) subject to τi leads to
∂ui
∂τi
= −ki −
1
2
(si − ki).
Due to the mobile tax base, the utility in a region i changes by a tax decision
of region j:
∂ui
∂τj
= f ′(ki)φ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τj
)
− (r + τi)φ
′
∂r
∂τj
− ki
∂r
∂τj
+ si
∂r
∂τj
= −
1
2
(si − ki).
Proof 2: Regions’ Utilities in the Disagreement Outcome. See that
u¯1 − u¯2 =
σ∫
o
d(u¯1 − u¯2)
dσ˜
dσ˜
is true. By the Envelope theorem for Nash equilibria (Caputo, 1996) the
derivative with respect to the difference in capital endowment σ is stated by
d(u¯1 − u¯2)
dσ˜
= r¯ +
∂u¯1
∂τ¯2
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
−
∂u¯2
∂τ¯1
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
Let ∂u¯1
∂τ¯2
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
− ∂u¯2
∂τ¯1
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
be X. If X > 0 holds for all σ˜,
d(u¯1 − u¯2)
dσ˜
> r¯ (A.2)
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is true. Hence u¯1 − u¯2 > σr¯ is proved with X > 0. X > 0 holds if
∂u¯1
∂τ¯2
,
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
,
∂u¯2
∂τ¯1
> 0
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
< 0
can be proved. In a first step ∂u¯i
∂τ¯j
> 0 is investigated. In a second step the
signs of ∂τ¯i
∂σ˜
, i = 1, 2 are determined. The utility u¯i = f(ki)− f
′(ki)ki+ sir+
b(τiki) in the disagreement outcome is differentiated with respect to τj , i 6= j,
so that
∂ui
∂τj
= −
1
2
(si − ki)−
1
2
b′(gi)τiφ
′.
The first term on the right hand side is negative if the region is a capital
exporter and it is positive if the region is a capital importer. The second
term is positive. Since I concentrate on a setting with small asymmetries
and therefore (si−ki) is supposed to be small, one can expect that the effect
of the second term dominates the first one in the case of a capital exporter.
Otherwise region i would prefer a low tax rate in region j. This does not seem
to be plausible for small asymmetries because region i then benefits from a
higher tax rate level in region j by inflowing capital. It follows ∂ui
∂τj
> 0.
To ascertain ∂τ¯i
∂σ˜
, see that the equation (4) determines the local tax rate
choice. With
−ki −
1
2
(si − ki) + b
′(gi)
(
ki +
1
2
τiφ
′
)
= 0 (A.3)
for the first order condition in region i, which must hold for all σ,
∂2u1
∂τ1∂σ
= −
1
4
φ′
(
∂τ1
∂σ
−
∂τ2
∂σ
)
−
1
4
+ b′′(g1)
(
k1
∂τ1
∂σ
+
1
2
τ1φ
′
(
∂τ1
∂σ
−
∂τ2
∂σ
))(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
+b′(g1)
(
φ′
∂τ1
∂σ
−
1
2
φ′
∂τ2
∂σ
)
=: 0
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holds for region 1. Rewriting yields
[
−
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)2
+ b′(g1)φ
′
]
a
∂τ1
∂σ
−
1
4
(A.4)
+
[
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g1)
1
2
τ1φ
′
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g1)φ
′
]
b
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0.
The first squared bracket is denoted by a and the second squared bracket is
called b. Thus we can write equation (A.4) as
a ·
∂τ1
∂σ
−
1
4
+ b ·
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0
⇔
∂τ1
∂σ
−
1
4a
+
b
a
·
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0. (A.5)
Differentiating the first order condition (A.3) for region i = 2 with respect
to σ yields
∂2u2
∂τ2∂σ
= −
1
4
φ′
(
∂τ2
∂σ
−
∂τ1
∂σ
)
+
1
4
+ b′′(g2)
(
k2
∂τ2
∂σ
+
1
2
τ2φ
′
(
∂τ2
∂σ
−
∂τ1
∂σ
))(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
+b′(g2)
(
φ′
∂τ2
∂σ
−
1
2
φ′
∂τ1
∂σ
)
=: 0.
Rearranging leads to
[
−
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g2)
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)2
+ b′(g2)φ
′
]
c
∂τ2
∂σ
+
1
4
(A.6)
+
[
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g2)
1
2
τ2φ
′
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g2)φ
′
]
d
∂τ1
∂σ
= 0.
The first squared bracket is denoted by c and the second squared bracket is
called d. Thus we can write equation (A.6) as
c ·
∂τ2
∂σ
+
1
4
+ d ·
∂τ1
∂σ
= 0
⇔
c
d
·
∂τ2
∂σ
+
1
4d
+
∂τ1
∂σ
= 0. (A.7)
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To ascertain the sign of ∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
in the tax competition equilibrium, the equation
(A.7) is subtracted from (A.5), so that
−
1
4a
−
1
4d
+
[
b
a
−
c
d
]
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0
⇔
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
= −
a+ d
4(ac− bd)
. (A.8)
To determine ∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
< 0, rearrange the equations (A.5) and (A.7) to
a
b
∂τ1
∂σ
−
1
4b
+
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0 (A.9)
d
c
∂τ1
∂σ
+
1
4c
+
∂τ2
∂σ
= 0. (A.10)
Subtraction of (A.10) from (A.9) yields
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
=
b+ c
4(ac− bd)
. (A.11)
I begin by investigating a+ d. It is stated as
a + d =
[
−
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)2
+ b′(g1)φ
′
]
a
+
[
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g2)
1
2
τ2φ
′
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g2)φ
′
]
d
=b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)2
+ b′(g1)φ
′ − b′′(g2)
1
2
τ2φ
′
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g2)φ
′.
(A.12)
b′′(gi) and φ
′ are negative. Furthermore, see that the regions are on the left
side of the Laffer curve. Thus ki+
1
2
τiφ
′ is positive. From there the first three
terms of (A.12) are negative. The last term of (A.12) is positive. But since
the asymmetry is assumed to be small so that g1 is closed to g2, the sum of
the second and the forth term is negative. Hence a+ d < 0 is proved.
Inserting the squared brackets from the equations (A.4) and (A.6) into b+ c
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yields
b+ c =
[
−
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g2)
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)2
+ b′(g2)φ
′
]
c
+
[
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g1)
1
2
τ1φ
′
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g1)φ
′
]
b
=b′′(g2)
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)2
+ b′(g2)φ
′ − b′′(g1)
1
2
τ1φ
′
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
−
1
2
b′(g1)φ
′.
(A.13)
From what we have learned already, the first and the third term of (A.13)
are negative. Furthermore, the sum of b′(g2) −
1
2
b′(g1) is positive in the
disagreement outcome if
1
2
b′(g¯1) ≤ b
′(g¯2) (A.14)
holds. As the analysis deals with small asymmetries in the capital market,
the local tax decision does not vary a lot among the regions. From there
(A.14) holds at least for the relevant settings and b+ c < 0 is true.
Last, the term ac − bd must be examined. For that the assumption of a
stable equilibrium in tax competition is used. If ac − bd is the determinant
of the Jacobian matrix describing the equilibrium of tax competition, it has
to be positive (Chiang and Wainwright, 2005: 627). Furthermore, the trace
trcJ has to be negative. The local tax rate choice is given in the first order
condition ∂ui
∂τi
= 0. Thus the equilibrium of tax competition is described by
the Jacobian matrix |J | to these equations. If
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2u1
∂τ2
1
∂2u1
∂τ1∂τ2
∂2u2
∂τ2∂τ1
∂2u2
∂τ2
2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ a bd c
∣∣∣∣∣
holds, the determinant |J | is given by ac− bd. Furthermore, the trace trcJ
is stated by a + c. Thus the stability of the equilibrium in tax competition
implies ac − bd to be positive and a + c to be negative. To prove that
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a = ∂
2u1
∂τ 21
, b = ∂
2u1
∂τ1∂τ2
, c = ∂
2u2
∂τ 22
and d = ∂
2u2
∂τ2∂τ1
, I derive the equations
determining the equilibrium of tax rate decisions. The choice of the tax rate
τi of region i is given by the first order conditions of the regions:
∂ui
∂τi
= −ki −
1
2
(si − ki) + b
′(gi)
(
ki +
1
2
τiφ
′
)
=: 0 (A.15)
(A.16)
Differentiation of (A.15) with respect to both tax rates yields for region 1
∂2u1
∂τ12
= −
1
2
φ′ +
1
4
φ′ + b′(g1)
(
1
2
φ′ +
1
2
φ′
)
+ b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)2
= −
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)2
+ b′(g1)φ
′
= a
for the differentiation with respect to τ1 and
∂2u1
∂τ1∂τ2
=
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)(
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
+ b′(g1)
(
−
1
2
)
φ′
= b
for the differentiation with respect to τ2. The differentiation is analogous for
region 2, so that
∂2u2
∂τ22
= −
1
4
φ′ + b′′(g2)
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)2
+ b′(g2)φ
′
= c
for the differentiation with respect to τ2 and
∂2u2
∂τ2∂τ1
=
1
4
φ′ − b′′(g2)
(
k2 +
1
2
τ2φ
′
)(
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
+ b′(g2)
(
−
1
2
)
φ′
= d
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for the differentiation with respect to τ1. Thus |J | = ac − bd holds and
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix equals the denominators of (A.11)
and (A.8). As this Nash equilibrium of tax rates is assumed to be stable,
ac− bd > 0 is proved. Since a and c are both negative, a+ c < 0 is true and
the trace is negative as required in a stable equilibrium.
With c+ b < 0 and a+ d < 0
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
=
c + b
4(ac− bd)
< 0
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
=
−(a+ d)
4(ac− bd)
> 0
is proved. For the disagreement outcome this implies τ¯1 < τ¯2 in the equilib-
rium of tax competition (result I). Together with
¯∂ui
∂τ¯j
> 0, i 6= j, the sign
of X is determined:
X =
∂u¯1
∂τ¯2
·
∂τ¯2
∂σ˜
−
∂u¯2
∂τ¯1
·
∂τ¯1
∂σ˜
> 0.
As X > 0 is proved for all σ, (A.2) is proved to be true so that
u¯1 − u¯2 > r¯σ
⇒u¯1 − u¯2 > 0
⇒u¯1 > u¯2.
For σ > 0, u¯1 > u¯2 holds (result II)
Proof 3: The Pareto Frontier. The maximization problem describing the
Pareto frontier is stated by
V2 = u2 + λp(τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2) + µP (u1 − uˆ1). (A.17)
The slope of the Pareto frontier P is du2
duˆ1
. By the Envelope theorem differ-
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entiation yields
du2
duˆ1
= −µP (A.18)
as the slope of the Pareto frontier P . P is strictly concave if
dµ
duˆ1
> 0. In a
first step the first order conditions of (A.17) are determined. Note, that the
marginal utilities ∂ui
∂τj
under equalization are given in proof 2. The partial
derivative of T with respect to a tax rate is
∂T
∂τi
= ki + τiφ
′
(
1 +
∂r
∂τi
)
+ τjφ
′
∂r
∂τi
= ki +
1
2
(τi − τj)φ
′
for i 6= j. From there the first order conditions of (A.17) describing the
Pareto frontier P are:
∂V2
∂τ1
= −
1
2
(s2 − k2) + λP
(
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
)
+ µP
(
−k1 −
1
2
(s1 − k1)
)
=: 0
(A.19)
∂V2
∂τ2
= −k2 −
1
2
(s2 − k2) + λP
(
k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
)
−
1
2
µP (s1 − k1) =: 0
(A.20)
∂V2
∂g1
= −λP + µP b
′(g1) =: 0 (A.21)
∂V2
∂g2
= b′(g2)− λP =: 0 (A.22)
∂V2
∂λP
= τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2 =: 0 (A.23)
∂V2
∂µP
= u1 − uˆ1 =: 0 (A.24)
∂V2
∂v
is also written as Vv. Rearranging equation (A.21) and (A.22) leads
to µP = b
′(g2)/b
′(g1). Total differentiation of the equation (A.19) to (A.24)
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leads to a linear equation system, which is written in the matrix notation:


Vτ1,τ1 Vτ1,τ2 Vτ1,g1 Vτ1,g2 Vτ1,λP Vτ1,µP
Vτ2,τ1 Vτ2,τ2 Vτ2,g1 Vτ2,g2 Vτ2,λP Vτ2,µP
Vg1,τ1 Vg1,τ2 Vg1,g1 Vg1,g2 Vg1,λP Vg1,µP
Vg2,τ1 Vg2,τ2 Vg2,g1 Vg2,g2 Vg2,λP Vg2,µP
Vλp,τ1 VλP ,τ2 VλP ,g1 VλP ,g2 VλP ,λP VλP ,µP
VµP ,τ1 VµP ,τ2 VµP ,g1 VµP ,g2 VµP ,λP VµP ,µP


·


dτ1
dτ2
dg1
dg2
dλP
dµP


=


−Vτ1,uˆ1
−Vτ2,uˆ1
−Vg1,uˆ1
−Vg2,uˆ1
−VλP ,uˆ1
−VµP ,uˆ1


duˆ1
(A.25)
Vv,w is obtained by differentiating the derivatives Vv, v = g1, ..., µP with re-
spect to the variables w,w = g1, ..., µP . The matrix on the left hand side of
equation (A.25) is labeled with D. By Cramer’s rule, dµ =
|Dµ|
|D|
expresses
the solution for marginal change of µ.
|D| is a Bordered Hessian determinant. As equation (A.17) has two side
conditions, |D| has two borders (m = 2). Furthermore, (A.17) provides the
four choice variables g1, g2, τ1 and τ2, so that its number is n = 4. Since the
sign of a matrix with n = m + 2 is (−1)m+2, |D| > 0 holds (Chiang, 2005:
362).
|Dµ| is the determinant of the matrix Dµ, which is obtained by replacing the
last column of |D| by the right hand side of (A.25). |Dµ| is stated by
|Dµ| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 0 k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ 0
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 0 k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′ 0
0 0 µP b
′′(g1) 0 −1 0
0 0 0 b′′(g2) −1 0
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′ −1 −1 0 0
−k1 −
1
2
(s1 − k1) −
1
2
(s1 − k1) b
′(g1) 0 0 duˆ1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
|Dµ| is expanded by the last column. Deleting the last row and the last
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column leads to the minor |Dµ
′
| of the element duˆ1, so that
|Dµ| = |Dµ6,6|duˆ1
is true. The minor |Dµ6,6| is given by
|Dµ6,6| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 0 k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 0 k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
0 0 µP b
′′(g1) 0 −1
0 0 0 b′′(g2) −1
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′ −1 −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
|Dµ6,6| is expanded by the forth column. Thus it is given by
|Dµ6,6| = b
′′(g2)|D
µ′
4,4| − (−1)|D
µ′
5,4|. (A.26)
|Dµ
′
4,4| is the minor to the element b
′′(g2) and obtained by deleting the forth
row and the forth column of |Dµ6,6|, so that it equates
|Dµ
′
4,4| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− µPλP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
φ′(1
4
− µPλP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
0 0 µP b
′′(g1) −1
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′ −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
|Dµ
′
4,4| is expanded by the third column, so that
|Dµ
′
4,4| = µP b
′′(g1)|D
µ′′
3,3| − (−1)|D
µ′′
3,4|
holds. To ascertain |Dµ
′
4,4|, |D
µ′′
3,3| and |D
µ′′
3,4| are determined. |D
µ′′
3,3| is obtained
by deleting the third row and the third column of |Dµ
′
4,4|, so that
|Dµ
′′
3,3| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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|Dµ
′′
3,3| is expanded by the last column. Therefore it yields
|Dµ
′′
3,3| =
(
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
) ∣∣∣∣∣ φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP )
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′ k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
∣∣∣∣∣
= φ′
(
1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP
)
(k1 + k2)
2.
The determinant |Dµ
′′
3,4| as a subdeterminant of |D
µ′
4,4| is obtained by deleting
the forth row and the third column of the matrix Dµ
′
4,4. Thus it is stated by
|Dµ
′′
3,4| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
0 0 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
|Dµ
′′
3,4| is expanded by the last row, so that
|Dµ
′′
3,4| = (−1)|D
µ′′′
3,3 |
holds. |Dµ
′′′
3,3 | is the subdeterminant of |D
µ′′
3,4| and obtained by deleting the
last row and the last column. From there
|Dµ
′′′
3,4 | = (−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP )
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP )
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
holds. Inserting |Dµ
′′
3,3| and |D
µ′′
3,4| = 0 in |D
µ′
4,4| yields
|Dµ
′
4,4| = µP b
′′(g1)
(
φ′
(
1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP
))
(k1 + k2)
2.
To ascertain |Dµ6,6|, |D
µ′
5,4| must be defined. |D
µ′
5,4| is the subdeterminant of
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|Dµ6,6| and it is obtained by deleting the fifth row and the forth column:
|Dµ
′
5,4| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ
′
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0 k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ
′
0 0 µP b
′′(g1) −1
0 0 0 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
The determinant |Dµ
′
5,4| is expanded by the last row, so that
|Dµ
′
5,4| = (−1)|D
µ′′
4,4|
holds. The minor |Dµ
′′
4,4| of the element (−1) is obtained by deleting the last
row and the last column of |Dµ
′
5,4|. Thus
|Dµ
′′
4,4| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) 0
0 0 µP b
′′(g1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is true. |Dµ
′′
4,4| is expanded to the element µP b
′′(g1) with the minor |D
µ′′′
3,3 |,
while
|Dµ
′′′
3,3 | =
∣∣∣∣∣ −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP )
φ′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ) −φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP )
∣∣∣∣∣
= 0
holds. With |Dµ
′′′
3,3 | = 0, the determinants |D
µ′′
4,4| and |D
µ′
5,4| are proved to be
zero. Inserting |Dµ
′
4,4| and |D
µ′
5,4| = 0 in equation (A.26) yields
|Dµ6,6| = µP b
′′(g2)b
′′(g1)
(
φ′
(
1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP
))
(k1 + k2)
2,
so that
|Dµ| = µP b
′′(g2)b
′′(g1)
(
φ′
(
1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP
))
(k1 + k2)
2duˆ1
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is true. Rearranging yields
dµP
duˆ1
=
µP b
′′(g2)b
′′(g1)(φ
′(1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP ))(k1 + k2)
2
|D|
.
Since b′′(gi) and φ
′ are negative and |D| is positive,
dµP
duˆ1
> 0 is proved if,
and only if, 1
4
− λP +
1
4
µP < 0. As λP = b
′(g2) and µP = b
′(g2)/b
′(g1) hold,
this condition can be written as
⇒
1
4
− b′(g2) +
1
4
b′(g2)
b′(g1)
< 0
⇔
1
b′(g2)
+
1
b′(g1)
< 4.
For all allocations of public spending, which satisfy 1
b′(g2)
+ 1
b′(g1)
< 4,
dµ
duˆ1
is positive.
Proof 4: Optimization of the Central Planner. The optimization
problem of the central planner is stated by
L1 = u1 + u2 + λ1(τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2). (A.27)
The optimum of (A.27) is described by the first order conditions
∂L1
∂τi
= −ki −
1
2
(si − ki)−
1
2
(sj − kj) + λ1
(
ki +
1
2
(τi − τj)φ
′
)
=: 0 (A.28)
∂L1
∂gi
= b′(gi)− λ1 =: 0 (A.29)
for i 6= j. From (A.29) it follows b′(g1) = b
′(g2) = λ1. Using also (s1 − k1) =
−(s2 − k2) rearranges the first order conditions (A.28) to
b′(gi) =
ki
ki +
1
2
(τi − τj)φ′
(A.30)
for i 6= j.
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Proof 5: The Bargaining Solution. The bargaining game of the cooper-
ative arrangement is stated by
n = (u1 − u¯1)(u2 + u¯2) + λ2(τ1k1 + τ2k2 − g1 − g2).
The optimum of the Nash product is given by the first order conditions
∂n
∂τi
=
[
−ki −
1
2
(si − ki)
]
(uj − u¯j) + (ui − u¯i)
[
−
1
2
(sj − kj)
]
(A.31)
+ λ2
(
ki +
1
2
(τi − τj)φ
′
)
=: 0
∂n
∂gi
= b′(gi)(uj − u¯j)− λ2 =: 0 (A.32)
From (A.32) it follows
b′(g1)(u2 − u¯2) = b
′(g2)(u1 − u¯1)
⇔
b′(g1)
b′(g2)
=
u1 − u¯1
u2 − u¯2
=: α (A.33)
Furthermore, with b′(gi)(uj − u¯j) = λ2 the first order condition (A.31) is
given by
[
−k1 −
1
2
(s1 − k1)
]
(u2 − u¯2) + (u1 − u¯1)
[
−
1
2
(s2 − k2)
]
+ b′(g1)(u2 − u¯2)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)
− b′(g2)(u1 − u¯1)
(
−
1
2
τ2φ
′
)
= 0
⇔
[
−k1 −
1
2
(s1 − k1) + b
′(g1)
(
k1 +
1
2
τ1φ
′
)]
(u2 − u¯2)
− (u1 − u¯1)
[
1
2
(s2 − k2) + b
′(g2)
(
−
1
2
τ1φ
′
)]
= 0 (A.34)
By virtue of equation (A.33) (u1 − u¯1) = α(u2 − u¯2) holds, so that equation
(A.34) is rewritten as
b′(g1) =
k1 +
1
2
(1− α)(s1 − k1)
k1 +
1
2
(τ1 − τ2)φ′
.
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The first order condition (A.31) can analogously be rearranged with (u2 −
u¯2) =
1
α
(u1 − u¯1) to the marginal utility of public spending in region 2:
b′(g2) =
k2 +
1
2
(1−α
α
)(s1 − k1)
k2 +
1
2
(τ2 − τ1)φ′
.
Proof 6: Absolute Improvement of the Regions. To prove u∗2 − u¯2 >
u∗1 − u¯1, see that
u∗2 − u¯2 > u
∗
1 − u¯1 (A.35)
⇔u¯1 − u¯2 > u
∗
1 − u
∗
2.
Since in W ∗ the allocation of public spending is given with g1 = g2 = g
∗ and
τ1 = τ2 = τ
∗ holds for the tax rates, the utilities u∗1 and u
∗
2 only differ in the
interest income:
u¯1 − u¯2 >f(k
∗)− f ′k∗ + s1r
∗ + b(g∗)− f(k∗) + f ′k∗ − s2r
∗ − b′(g∗)
⇔u¯1 − u¯2 > σr
∗. (A.36)
Proof 2 has shown that u¯1 − u¯2 > σr¯. If, in addition, r¯ > r
∗ holds, equation
(A.35) is true and u∗1 − u¯1 < u
∗
2 − u¯2 is proved. Since
∂r
∂τi
= −12 , i = 1, 2, is
constant,
r∗ − r¯ =
∂r(τ¯1, τ¯2)
∂τ1
(τ ∗1 − τ¯1) +
∂r(τ¯1, τ¯2)
∂τ2
(τ ∗2 − τ¯2)
= −
1
2
(τ ∗1 − τ¯1 + τ
∗
2 − τ¯2)
From there it is sufficient to prove r∗ < r¯ with τ ∗1 + τ
∗
2 > τ¯1 + τ¯2. As the
model deals only with small asymmetries, both tax rates in the disagreement
outcome are inefficiently low so that the marginal utility b′(g¯i) > 1, i = 1, 2.
In W ∗, in contrast, the amount of public spending is welfare maximizing and
b′(g∗i ) = 1, i = 1, 2, holds. A higher sum of public spending goes along with a
higher sum of tax rates when regions are on the left side of the Laffers curve.
Thus τ ∗1 + τ
∗
2 > τ¯1 + τ¯2 must be true and r¯ > r
∗ holds. With it, (A.36) is
33
true so that u∗1 − u¯1 < u
∗
2 − u¯2 is proved. Hence it is proved that
dun2
du1
∣∣∣∣∣
W ∗
= −
u∗2 − u¯2
u∗1 − u¯1
< −1.
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